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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL
RIGHTS - POSSESSING AND EXHIBITING FILM -
EVOLUTION OF AN OBSCENITY 'STANDARD
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
The petitioner, manager of a motion picture theatre, was con-
victed of possessing and exhibiting an allegedly obscene film.' The
Ohio Supreme Court upheld the conviction.2 The United States
Supreme Court reversed,' holding that the motion picture was not
obscene according to the standards set forth in Roth v. United
States,4 and that exhibition of the film was protected by the guaran-
tees of the first and fourteenth amendments.5
The first obscenity standard was enunciated in the early English
case of Regina v. Hicklin.6 There, the court held that a work would be
obscene if in the opinion of the least sophisticated elements of the
1. The opinion of the lower court is not reported. The conviction was by three judges
after waiver of jury trial, for violating OHIO REV. CODE § 2905.34:
No person shall knowingly sell, lend, give away, exhibit, or offer to sell, lend,
give away, or exhibit, or publish or offer to publish or have in his possession
or under his control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, magazine, pamphlet,
paper, writing, advertisement, circular, print, picture, photograph, motion
picture film, or book, pamphlet, paper, magazine not wholly obscene but
containing lewd or lascivious articles, advertisements, photographs, or draw-
ing, representation, figure, image, cast, instrument, or article of an indecent
or immoral nature, or a drug, medicine, article, or thing intended for the pre-
vention of conception or for causing an abortion, or advertise any of them for
sale, or write, print, or cause to be written or printed a card, book, pamphlet,
advertisement, or notice giving information when, where, how, of whom,
or by what means any of such articles or things can be purchased or obtained,
or manufacture, draw, print, or make such article or things, or sell, give away,
or show to a minor, a book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper, story paper, or
other paper devoted to the publication, or principally made up, of criminal
news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures and stories of
immoral deeds, lust, or crime, or exhibit upon a street or highway or in a
place which may be within the view of a minor, any of such books, papers,
magazines, or pictures.
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than two hundred nor
more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned not less than one nor more
than seven years, or both.
2. State v. Jacobellis, 173 Ohio St. 22, 179 N.E.2d 777 (1962).
3. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
4. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
5. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
6. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), where Chief Justice Cockburn stated: "I think the test
of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to de-
prave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall." Id. at 371. (Emphasis added.)
6Obscenity Standard'
community any isolated part of the work appeared as such. This
rigid test was long utilized in most American jurisdictions,7 and
was not seriously challenged until 1913 in United States v. Kenner-
ley.' The Hicklin standard was rejected twenty-one years later in
United States v. One Book Entitled "°Ulysses,' which fully recog-
nized the inadequacy of the test and the necessity of examining a work
in its entirety and the purpose of its contents. The Supreme Court's
first serious consideration of the obscenity issue occurred in 1957
with the decision in Butler v. Michigan."0 There the Court declared
that communities could not foreclose adults from access to material
that might tend to corrupt minors. But the significance of the
Butler decision was soon overshadowed by the Court's decision in
Roth v. United States," decided in the same term. The Roth case
reached two important conclusions. First, the Court adopted a
standard by which obscenity must be judged: "[W]hether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest."'2 Second, the Court held that obscenity is not protected
by the first amendment as it is utterly without redeeming social
importance. 3 Obscenity was defined as material dealing with sex in
a manner appealing to the prurient interest, i.e., material with a
tendency to excite lustful thoughts.'4 The Court emphasized that
any idea with "even the slightest redeeming social importance" is
fully protected by the Constitution unless the work infringes on
another more important interest.'5
7. See generally Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: the Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960).
8. 209 Fed. 119, 120-21 (S.DN.Y. 1913). The relevant portions of this opinion
are considered in the Jacobellis decision itself.
9. 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934).
10. 352 U.S. 380 (1957); see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 7, at 6, 13-18. This
was the first time the Court confronted the constitutional problem. Nine years earlier,
in Doubleday Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948), the Court had affirmed per cur-
iam Doubleday's conviction for publishing Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate
County.
11. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12. Id. at 489. This test was not new, but rather a test which some American courts
had already adopted in lieu of the offensive Hicklin test. Id. at 489 n.26. The Court
noted that the lower courts - the federal district court in the Roth case and the Cali-
fornia state court in Alberts v. California, Roth's companion case - had properly ap-
plied the test. Id. at 489.
13. Id. at 484-85.
14. Id. at 487 n.20.
15. Id. at 484. In four later per curiam decisions, the Court reversed courts of appeal
decisions upholding obscenity censorship. Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355
U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v. United States,
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The Roth decision raised a number of fundamental questions,
many of which remain unanswered today. Jacobellis v. Ohio does,
however, clarify one element in the Roth test:' 6 the contemporary
community is the nation, not a state or local unit, and the standards
are determined by society at large, not the local community.1"
In reaching this interpretation, the Court recognized that it
was confronted with reconciling the rights of many and diverse
355 U.S. 180 (1957); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 35 (1957). For
a discussion of these cases, see Lockhart & McClure, supra note 7, at 5, 32-33 nn.163 &
164. Later, in Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N. Y., 360 U.S.
684 (1959), the Court struck down a New York decision which prohibited the exhibi-
tion of the motion picture, "Lady Chatterly's Lover," and made clear that ideological cen-
sorship will not be tolerated. Also in 1959, in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959), the Court found that the ordinance under which appellant was convicted elim-
inated any scienter from the crime, thereby substantially restricting freedom of expres-
sion and violating the constitutional guarantees in this area.
16. Before reaching this issue, Justice Brennan emphasized that questions of fact re-
quire de novo review and that the Court will make an independent constitutional judg-
ment on the facts of each case to determine whether the material involved is constitu-
tionally protected. It is the Court's duty to ascertain the "dim and uncertain line"
that often distinguishes obscenity and constitutionally protected material, consistent with
its duty to enforce constitutional guarantees. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187-90
(1964); see also Lockhart & McClure, supra note 7, at 116-19. The Court relied
heavily on this article, not only on this point, but on several others. It did so justi-
fiably, as the article is an extensive critical analysis of what the Court had done in the
area of obscenity prior to 1960, with an appraisal of possible future paths for the Court
to follow. On this particular point the authors emphasize, and the Court quotes:
It may be true ... that judges "possess no special expertise" qualifying them
to supervise the private morals of the Nation" or to decide "what movies
are good or bad for the local communities." But they do have a far keener un-
derstanding of the importance of free expression than do most government ad-
ministrators or jurors, and they have had considerable experience in making
value judgments of the type required by the constitutional standards for ob-
scenity. If freedom is to be preserved, neither government censorship experts
nor juries can be left to make the final effective decisions restraining free ex-
pression. Their decisions must be subject to effective, independent review,
and we know of no group better qualified for that review than the appellate
judges of this country under the guidance of the Supreme Court. Jacobellis
v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188-89 n.3 (1964).
17. 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964). The Court points out that Judge Learned Hand
was the first to express the concept of "contemporary community standards" as follows:
Yet, if the time is not yet when men think innocent all that which is hon-
estly germane to a pure subject, however little it may mince its words, still I
scarcely think that they would forbid all which might corrupt the most cor-
ruptible, or that society is prepared to accept for its own limitations those
which may perhaps be necessary to the weakest of its members. If there be
no abstract definition, such as I have suggested, should not the word "obscene"
be allowed to indicate the present critical point in the compromise between
candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here and
now? ... To put thought in leash to the average conscience of the time is
perhaps tolerable, but to fetter it by the necessities of the lowest and least
capable seems a fatal policy.
Nor is it an objection, I think, that such an interpretation gives to the words
of the statute a varying meaning from time to time. Such words as these
do not embalm the precise morals of an age or place; while they presuppose
Obscenity Standard
communities throughout the country with the overall rights of
individuals. In determining the balance in favor of the individual,
the Court pointed out that the mobility of the American people
rendered the concept of any definable local community meaningless.
In addition, the Court found that social pressure would cause many
communities to suppress material if permitted to adopt a local
standard, since few would risk disseminating in their community
what had already been deemed obscene in another. Thus, ma-
terial which the state could not constitutionally suppress directly
would nevertheless be withheld from the public - a result pre-
viously indicated to be intolerable by the Court. 8 This broad in-
terpretation of the "contemporary community standards" aspect of
the Roth test is consistent with the Court's view of the federal sys-
tem as demonstrated in other areas.' " The standard is now a na-
tional one which might vary from time to time, but not from town
to town or region to region. And there is justification for this en-
largement. In its early history, this country was composed of a
group of distinct and fairly autonomous states, each determining a
local standard of mores for its particular citizens. Communications
were poor. Surely the prevailing morality of the West during its
early years of development was far different from that of New
England at the same time."0 However, regional autonomy is today
superficial and shrinking. With the advent of revolutionary de-
velopments in communications, this country has become politically
and culturally unified; the same radio and television programs, the
same books, magazines, and motion pictures are disseminated
that some things will always be shocking to the public taste, the vague subject-
matter is left to the gradual development of general notions about what is
decent .... Id. at 192-93.
It should be pointed out that although in Jacobellis the Court intimated that this mean-
ing of "contemporary community standards" was intended in Roth as well as in Learned
Hand's opinion, an examination of both decisions does not affirmatively support such
a view. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Roth, stated that the trial courts
below properly applied the test for determining obscenity. The trial record indicates
that the judge emphasized the concept of the community as a whole, rather than any
one segment of it, but does not support any particular definition of a local or national
"community." Further, in Roth, the Court referred to Learned Hand's opinion as one
which had "adopted" the Hicklin standard. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489
(1957). It is suggested here that just as the Court relies upon Lockhart & McClure,
supra note 7, in support of other theories advanced in the case, so it found in that study
an excellent method of justifying an interpretation of "contemporary community stan-
dards" which, if intended in Roth, was never made clear.
18. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193-94 (1964).
19. Consider, for example, the area of search and seizure and the decisions in Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20. See generally WILLIAMS, CURRENT & FREIDEL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (1959).
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throughout the fifty states. Application of a concept of "national
community" - and the Court emphasized that it never had any
other in mind2 - only recognizes that today the concept of
local cultural autonomy is no more than a fiction. No community
can truly isolate itself.22
Another question, perhaps, is whether a national standard is
practicable. It has been pointed out that there is probably no na-
tional consensus as to what constitutes obscenity beyond the con-
sensus on hard-core pornography; hence, any national standard is
illusory.2" Nevertheless, even though the Court appears to have
limited obscenity to hard-core pornography, there is no readily de-
finable standard of obscenity. But the advantage derived from this
more progressive and sophisticated concept compensates for the
difficulties in application.
The Jacobellis case clarifies another area of confusion in the
Roth decision involving the definition of obscenity. In Roth, the
Court adopted the Model Penal Code test of the "appeal to prurient
interest,"24 but rejected its intended meaning by defining obscene
material as "material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.""
The Model Penal Code had rejected the latter definition as unreal-
istically broad for our society, and as involving constitutional and
practical problems in attempting to regulate thoughts unconnected
with overt behavior.26
While reaffirming Roth and the Model Penal Code test, the
Jacobellis decision stressed a different element: the necessity that
material not only have a predominant appeal to prurient interest,
but that in addition it go "substantially beyond customary limits of
candor in describing or representing such matters."2" Thus, ob-
21. See note 17 supra.
22. This does not automatically foreclose the possibility of a community protecting
itself, for example, by prohibiting dissemination of certain material or exhibition of
movies to minors and enforcing these prohibitions. In Jacobellis, the Court recognizes
a variable concept of obscenity in reaching its decision: any state or region may legiti-
mately protect children from certain material that is not offensive when restricted to
adult use. "The Lovers" film was exhibited to adults and consequently falls under
the "strict standard" - strict in its limitation of obscenity to a very narrow area -
applicable in determining the ambit of constitutionally protected expression. The im-
plication is clear that had the film been exhibited to children, the standard and the
result might well have been different. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
23. Lockhart & McClure, supra note 7, at 112-13.
24. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957).
25. Ibid.
26. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2), comment 2(a) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). This more
recent draft adds the words "in addition," thus stressing that this is a separate and
distinct element of obscenity.
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scenity now appears to require proof of three distinct elements:2"
(1) that the material considered as a whole appeal to prurient
interest; (2) that this aspect of appeal predominate over other
attractions or values in the material;29 and (3) that the material
be "patently offensive."3 If any of these elements is lacking, the
material cannot be constitutionally proscribed. In regard to the
last element, the question still remains as to what is material that
"goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description
or representation," and what standard is to be applied. There can
be little doubt that the Court intended that a national standard
should be applied here too: "In the absence of deviation from
society's standards of decency, we do not see how any official in-
quiry into allegedly prurient appeal of a work of expression can be
squared with the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments."31  Thus, an element of the Roth test, far from clear in
that decision, has been explained, and censorship further restricted.
. In evaluating the Jacobellis decision it becomes apparent that
many of the problems raised in Roth and earlier cases remain
unresolved. First, there remains the questionable validity of the
"average person" standard in determining the value of allegedly
obscene materials. A thoughtful examination of this hypothetical
person reveals at best a paradox. Would the "average person" be
capable of ascertaining what is "utterly without redeeming social
importance," as distinguished from material with some literary,
artistic, or other social value? And why should the "average per-
son" establish the criterion of obscenity? The "average person"
standard smacks too much of tort law where such a standard is
certainly intellectually acceptable - if not essential - in determin-
ing what degree of care should be exercised by an individual. But
surely that question is not as fundamental as any posed in confront-
ing the most basic freedoms of self-expression and creativity.
The evolution of an obscenity standard in this country has
28. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2), comment 6(c) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
29. The Court stresses that portrayal of sex in itself is no reason to deny material con-
stitutional protection, if it advocates ideas of social value, or has literary, scientific, ar-
tistic or any kind of social value. Only that material which is "utterly without redeem-
ing social importance" can be proscribed. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
30. "MIThe appeal to prurient interest must be by description or representation going
substantially beyond customary limits on free expression." MODEL PENAL CODE §
207.10 (2), comment 6 (c), at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957); see Manuel Enterprises,
Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482-88 (1962), referred to by the Court, where Justice
Harlan refers to the quality of "patent offensiveness" or "indecency" as a distinct ele-
ment of obscenity.
31. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
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progressed from the dark ages of the Hicklin era to the middle
ground of Jacobellis; from the judgment of the least sophisticated
elements of a particular local community to the judgment of the
average person throughout the nation. Perhaps a further step
should now be taken: the substitution of the most enlightened
element of our nation for that of the average person. This would
be a variable concept. For example, in reviewing a book the judg-
ment of those who create, read, or criticize books should be the
criterion; in evaluating a painting, the judgment should be made
by those who create or criticize paintings. These are the peo-
ple best qualified to make so fundamental a determination -
and they may well be the only people capable of making such a
determination. Some may argue that such a step would encourage
tyranny of a new minority - the 6lite - in place of the minority
of the benighted which the Hicklin standard enshrined; or in place
of the majority apparently envisioned at present by the Supreme Court.
The philosophical and social question here is whether the demo-
cratic principle of majority rule is a standard conducive to creativity
and to the experimentation which is so necessary to progress in
the arts. It is true that a standard based on the judgment of the
most enlightened sector of the public transposes the problem from
the definition of the average man to that of the most enlightened.
Still, the difficulties are no greater, but the concept is more progres-
sive. In confronting the basic freedom of self-expression and crea-
tivity, the most intelligent or creative individual should not be
harnessed to the criterion of the "average person" who, by definition
to some, remains at the level of mediocrity, or at least non-creativity.
No consideration of this area should be concluded without rais-
ing the question of whether any censorship is necessary, a question
unambiguously answered in the negative by two members of the
Court. It is submitted here that censorship inherently reflects a
lack of self-confidence of a society in its people, a feeling that moral
tutelage is necessary even for adults. The more totalitarian a
society, or the more primitive, the more extensive is the cen-
sorship. Society's efforts might well be more profitably ex-
pended in an attempt to better enforce prohibitions on sales or
exhibition of certain materials to minors, rather than in proscribing
these materials for all and harping upon an anxiety to preserve the
moral fiber in society." Thus, a rigid standard of proscription
32. In his dissent, Chief Justice Warren bases his justification on "protection of so-
ciety's right to maintain its moral fiber and the effective administration of justice ....
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could be applied to material aimed at children, but all censorship
of material aimed at adults could be abrogated, with the possible
exception of "hard-core pornography" most narrowly defined.
In the evolution of the Court's attitude towards obscenity, sev-
eral criteria have been established: first, in determining obscenity,
the Court will give de novo review to questions of constitution-
al fact; second, no material may be examined as isolated parts,
nor judged by the members of the community most susceptible
to its appeal; third, a national standard will be applied; fourth, ma-
terial with any amount of social importance will be afforded con-
stitutional protection under the first and fourteenth amendments,
but if the material is deemed obscene, dealing predominantly with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest in addition to going
beyond customary limits of candor in representation, it will not
receive constitutional protection; and fifth, the concept of ob-
scenity is a variable one, allowing a community to protect children
from material that is not offensive when restricted to adult use. But
the establishment of these criteria has not promoted unanimity in
application. The general difficulty in the obscenity area is well
demonstrated by the split among the members of the Court in the
Jacobellis decision. Six different opinions were written in this
case, reflecting the individualistic attitude of the Court's members
and the lack of agreement in the area.s One may well wonder
what this disparity will mean in terms of the future.
Taken as a whole, the Jacobellis decision represents a progres-
sive step in the evolution of obscenity standards. It recognizes many
of the problems raised by Roth and other earlier cases, and although
Jacobelis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 202 (1964). Since 1957, the Court has recognized
the necessary distinction between censoring material aimed at minors and that aimed at
adults. And in Jacobelis, it makes clear that the standard applied in the former in-
stance would have to be stricter. See note 22 supra.
33. Id. at 195. Justices Black and Douglas concurred, adhering to their strict reading
of the first amendment, Justice Stewart concurred; Justice Goldberg concurred; Justice
Harlan dissented; Chief Justice Warren and Justice Clark dissented, expressing their
belief that "community standards" referred to a local, not a national standard. "[Ihere
is no provable national standard and perhaps there should be none." Id. at 200. Chief
Justice Warren and Justice Clark advocate a variable concept of obscenity, depending on
the "use" to which the various materials are put - e.g., if sold to children. Among
other thoughts, these two justices would commit enforcement of the rule to appropriate
state and federal courts and prevent the Supreme Court from "sitting as the Super Cen-
sor of all the obscenity purveyed throughout the Nation." Id. at 203. Thus, if the
Rotb test was properly applied in the court below, they would apply a "sufficient evi-
dence" standard of review requiring something more than merely any evidence but
something less than "substantial evidence on the record [including the allegedly obscene
material] as a whole." Ibid.
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